Effectivity of Various Data Retention Schemes for Single-Hop Proxy Servers by Herrmann, Dominik & Wendolsky, Rolf
Effectivity of Various Data Retention Schemes for
Single-Hop Proxy Servers
Dominik Herrmann
University of Regensburg, Germany
Rolf Wendolsky
JonDos GmbH, Regensburg, Germany
Abstract
Recently, member states of the European Union have legislated new data re-
tention policies. Anonymisation services and proxy servers undermine such data
retention efforts, as they allow users tomasquerade their IP addresses. Providers of
such services have to implement effective data retention mechanisms allowing for
traceability while at the same time preserving users’ privacy as far as possible. In
this paper we analyse the effectivity of four data retention schemes for single-hop
proxy servers which use information already stored in logs today. We assess their
effectivity by applying them to the historic logs of a mid-range proxy server. Ac-
cording to our evaluation it is insufficient to record data on session-level. Users can
only be unambiguously identified with high probability if access time and source
address of each request are stored together with the destination address. This re-
sult indicates that effective data retention based on currently available identifiers
comes at a high cost for users’ privacy.
1 Introduction
In 2006, the European Union issued the Data Retention Directive [4]. For the purpose
of law enforcement, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may thereby be required to un-
cover the identity of a user, given an IP address and a timestamp. The Directive has to
be implemented by member states until March 15th, 2009. The German implementa-
tion for Internet access has gone into force on January 1st, 2009. Since then, providers
of telecommunication services have to retain transformation data for a period of six
months.
While the implementation of data retention measures is rather straightforward for
ISPs, interesting questions arise when data retention is applied to proxy servers and
anonymisation services. There is still considerable uncertainty about which types of
services are affected by the new data retention regulations. Although those legal dis-
cussions are of high practical relevance, they often neglect the implications regarding
the involved technologies and the impact on users’ privacy. The factual evidence pre-
sented in this paper is intended to foster a more technology-aware discussion.
In the context of anonymisation services and proxies, data retention measures have
to allow for traceability, i. e., uncovering the IP address of a user from whom a sus-
picious connection originated (cf. Richard Clayton’s PhD thesis for more information
on that topic [3]). While some people consider traceability of Internet users funda-
mentally necessary to enable crime detection and prevention, it is criticised by others
for unduly infringing users’ privacy. Moreover, ISPs complain that implementing and
operating a data retention infrastructure is a costly undertaking. Law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) or related governmental organisations have not specified technical re-
quirements regarding data retention on proxy servers and anonymisation services so
far. Devising effective data retention mechanisms allowing for traceability while at the
same time preserving users’ privacy is the challenge at hand.
In this context Kesdogan et al. [7] have researched the effectivity of various intersection
attacks from the literature using the log files of a proxy server. Berthold et al. [1] have
evaluated the effectivity of intersection attacks on the AN.ON/JonDonym anonymi-
sation service, i. e., whether the provider of the anonymisation service can unambigu-
ously reconstruct the source IP address of an offender, given a number of events when
the designated offender was using the service. The authors find that the size of the
anonymity group decreases rapidly with an increasing number of events available for
building the intersection. According to their results another means to improve trace-
ability is increasing the accuracy of the timestamps used by LEAs. Intersection attacks
have one drawback, though: they rely on the fact that LEAs are able to identify mul-
tiple requests from the same offender, all of them coming from the source IP address.
Köpsell et al. [8] propose a request-level data retention scheme specifically designed
for distributed anonymisation services. It is based on threshold group signatures to
allow for the revocation of the anonymity of offending users while preserving the pri-
vacy of all other users. Köpsell et al. do not define which kind of information is stored
to identify offending users, though. The schemes in this paper are possible realisations
for their proposal.
The debate regarding towhat extent providers of proxy servers and anonymisation ser-
vices will have to implement data retention has not settled yet. In this paper we will
analyse various conceivable retention schemes which only utilise data already avail-
able today to the providers of such services. The evaluated schemes do not rely on
intersection attacks and could be implemented easily. Based on an empircial study us-
ing the log files of a medium-range proxy server we find that data retention schemes
utilising currently available data is only effective if information about the requested
destination addresses is stored, which is not satisfactory from a user’s perspective.
Therefore, our paper motivates further research in this field in order to find better data
retention schemes which address the security and privacy requirements of all involved
parties.
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Figure 1: Distribution of request numbers for the evaluated sample
2 Evaluation Methodology
In the interest of conciseness we limit our analysis to HTTP traffic which is relayed by
single-hop web proxies. In order to get comparable results we implemented various
data retention schemes and applied all of them to a common log file of a proxy server.
As providers of anonymisation services refrain from keeping log files containing in-
formation to the necessary extent, for this preliminary study we used Squid log files
of a local school with about 1,000 students and about 100 staff members. The log files
contained the pseudonymised requests of six months (August 2008 to February 2009).
The combined log file contains 9,074,962 requests in total originating from 126 distinct
(local) source IP addresses. The users requested objects from 33,258 destination IP
addresses which have been accessed via 51,746 different host names. The plot in Fig-
ure 1a shows the relative access frequencies of the host names ordered by their popu-
larity (based on the number of total requests per host name, most active first), which
indicates that in our sample the retrieved web sites follow a Zipf-like or power law
distribution [10]. This feature has been observed in several earlier studies for web re-
quests from a homogenous community of users (cf. [2, 5]). According to the histogram
in Figure 1b the user group consists of both, power users and less active ones.
These characteristics have to be kept inmindwhen interpreting the results of our study,
i. e., they only apply to systems which serve a rather small and homogenuous user
group and probably cannot be easily generalised to large-scale anonymisation services.
The absolute values of the results are certainly affected by the specific composition of
our user group and its behaviour in a school setting.1 Nevertheless, we believe our
proposed methodology may be used to assess the effectivity of data retention schemes
on such systems.
For the evaluation we created stripped-down versions of the Squid log file contain-
ing only the information which would be available for the examined data retention
schemes. We then analysed the effectivity as expressed by the ratio of requests which
could have been unambiguously attributed to the correct source IP address for the var-
1Some pages containing unsuitable content for students are filtered at the proxy level. This may add
to the bias in our sample.
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Figure 2: Model of the evaluated single-hop proxy scenario
ious schemes. The ratio was calculated by complete enumeration, i. e., we created LEA
queries for each request contained in the log file, every time recording the number of
potentially matching requests. For maximum effectivity the result set would have to
contain only one request for each query.
3 Data Retention Schemes for Single-Hop Systems
Figure 2 illustrates the single-hop setup. The proxy is used by n users with IP addresses
aini ∈ Ain. From the viewpoint of the destination server, the request originates from
an IP address aoutj ∈ Aout. Note that |Ain| > |Aout| in most cases, i. e., the number of
unique input addresses exceeds the number of IP addresses of the proxy. For our proxy
|Aout| = 1. We will present four different retention schemes in the following sections.
3.1 Recording Input Addresses on Session-Level
Session-oriented services like VPN-based anonymisation services could record the re-
levant session-level information. If tstart and tend denote begin and end timestamps of
a user’s session with the anonymisation service, the provider would store the tuple
(tstart, tend, ain, aout) for each session. Note that individual HTTP requests, which are
relayed during a session, are not considered. From a privacy point of view this solution
is the most desirable form of data retention. Only a bare minimum of information is
recorded. Personal information – apart from the usage time – is not stored.
Traceability cannot be guaranteed at all times with this approach. Faced with a LEA
query q = (t(q), a(q)out, a
(q)
dest) for some timestamp t
(q), one of the proxy’s output ad-
dresses a(q)out ∈ Aout and the destination address a(q)dest, e. g., q=(2008-10-10 9:43am GMT,
132.199.2.111, 66.249.93.104), the service provider may not be able to uniquely iden-
tify one of its users as requested. He can only provide all source IP addresses aini of
all sessions established at t(q) and relayed over aout. Note that the destination address
a
(q)
dest does not help to reduce the anonymity group because the service provider is not
storing any destination addresses in this scheme.
With this scheme even inactive users contribute to the anonymity group. Intuitively,
tracing a request back to its originator is only possible if there is only a single session
at t(q), which is very unlikely for popular proxies. If multiple requests from different
sessions could be attributed to the same user, LEAs could intersect the result sets to
decrease the size of the anonymity group.
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Figure 3: Data retention effectivity for session- and request-based services
Obviously, traceability largely depends on the duration of the individual user sessions.
We analysed the influence of the session length on the effectivity by grouping consec-
utive requests from an individual IP within the simulated session duration into one
contiguous session. As shown in Figure 3a the effectivity of this scheme is dropping
extremely fast with increasing session durations. Even for rather short sessions of only
300 seconds, less than 5% of requests can be identified unambiguously. For busier
proxies with thousands of users this figure is expected to approach zero.
Using a regression analysis we found that the plotted data closely fits a power function
(y ≈ 0.3921x−0.3932 with a residual sum of squares rss ≈ 3.018 · 10−4).
3.2 Recording Input Addresses on Request-Level
Common web proxy servers, e. g., the Squid cache proxy or many form-based
CGI proxies, operate on individual HTTP requests. They could store the tuple
(ttransform, ain, aout), where ttransform is the point in time when the input address was
transformed into the output address.2 Anonymity groups become considerably
smaller as inactive users are not included in the result set anymore. Traceability cannot
be guaranteed when multiple users issue requests at the same time, though.
Figure 3b depicts the effectivity of this scheme. Although the plot looks similar to
the session-based case, request-based data retention is more effective: the effectivity
depends only on the accuracy of the timestamps used in the log files and the LEA
query. The accuracy will be degraded if the clocks of the service provider and the
destination site are not synchronized or if non-deterministic network latencies cause
unforeseen delays.
In comparison to the session-based data retention scheme, logging data on the request
level offers potentially higher effectivity because of a much more precise time resolu-
tion. Given a hypothetical timestamp accuracy of 60 seconds, all requests within a time
window of 30 seconds around the point in time specified in the LEA query are part of
2Of course, this scheme is not limited to services operating on a request level, i. e., session-based
services like VPNs could store request-level data, too.
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Figure 4: Impact of storing destination addresses on data retention effectivity
the result set. For a hypothetical timestamp accuracy of 60 seconds about 7.9% of re-
quests can be unambiguously identified in our sample. This ratio climbs up to 39% if
timestamp accuracy would be increased to one second. Again, we expect these figures
to decrease tremendously on busy proxies.
We presume that realistic values of the timestamp accuracy for Internet hosts lie in
the range between one and 60 seconds. To the best of our knowledge the available
timestamp accuracy has not been analysed so far. Further research is necessary.
3.3 Recording Destination IP Addresses
In the previous section we have excluded destination addresses from data retention.
For increased traceability, anonymisation services might be forced to store the IP ad-
dresses of the destination servers. In this case they would store (ttransform, ain, aout, adest)
for each request. This approach reduces the size of the anonymity group considerably.
Now, only IP addresses of users requesting an object from a(q)dest at time t
(q) are included.
So, again, the effectivity of this scheme depends on the available timestamp accuracy
(cf. Figure 4a) . Given a timestamp accuracy of 60 seconds 95.8% of the requests in
our sample can be unambiguously attributed to a single user with this scheme (96.8%
given an accuracy of one second). Effectivity is still not perfect, though, as there is
still a (relatively small) possibility that several users are accessing different objects on
the same destination server within the requested time window, which may happen for
example when various web sites are (virtually) hosted on the same physical server.
From a privacy viewpoint storing destination IP addresses is not desirable, though, as
they may reveal information about the interests of users to the service provider for the
whole retention time span.
3.4 Recording Destination Host Names
The last scheme we present in this paper is based on the previous one. Instead of
recording destination IP addresses, DNS host names are stored in order to further re-
duce the size of the result set. The result set will then only contain source IP addresses
of users who have accessed the same (virtual) host at a given point in time, thus allow-
ing for an exact match in most cases.
As expected our results show only small increases in effectivity when host names are
stored (cf. Figure 4b). Given the timestamp accuracy of 60 seconds, for 96.3% of the re-
quests the originator can be identified. Apparently, the set of simultaneously retrieved
pages which are co-located on the same host is rather small in our sample. Note that ef-
fectivity could still be improved slightly if – instead of host names – the complete URLs
including HTTP query parameters would be stored. Even then, traceability could not
be guaranteed for encrpyted web sites (HTTPS), though, because the proxy could only
log host name and port of them. And of course multiple users might still coinciden-
tally request the same URL. As the expected benefits of this scheme are rather low for
our sample, we have not implemented it so far.
The effectivity of this approach comes at a high cost. While host names may disclose
the personal interests and habits of users, URLs may even contain personal or sensitive
information (e. g., search engine queries, session IDs, and unencrypted credentials).
Storing information of this kind on a proxy server over a period of six months causes
considerable privacy and security issues and therefore seems disproportionate.
4 Conclusion
This paper examined four data retention schemes in terms of their effectivity. The pre-
sented schemes only rely on data easily available to providers of proxy and anonymi-
sation services, i. e., they are straghtforward to implement based on already existing
logging facilities. Effective data retention schemes have to offer traceability of – ideally
– all requests which are handled by such services to law enforcement agencies.
According to our empirical study, none of the examined schemes can guarantee trace-
ability for all requests. Namely, we found that storing session-level data is not suffi-
cient because the anonymity groups become too large even on our little-frequented
proxy for typical session lengths. Logging on a request-level basis seems more promis-
ing, but only if the destination address of each request is recorded – which infringes
users’ privacy. None of the evaluated data retention schemes provides effective trace-
ability while respecting users’ privacy. Although we have utilised a synthetic sample,
we believe that our methodology is of general value and it could be applied to many
kinds of anonymisation services, e. g., CGI-based proxies using HTML forms or VPN
solutions (as provided by anonymizer.com), mix cascades (provided by JonDonym [6])
and Onion Routing (cf. the Tor project [9]).
In future work we plan to repeat the evaluation with log files from a proxy server
with a higher load and a more diverse user base or even a real-world anonymisation
service. This will allow us to rule out any bias caused by the data source chosen for
this preliminary study. Within this future story we will also be able to examine the
efficacy of intersection attacks, i. e., under which circumstances they reduce the size of
the anonymity groups over time.
Furthermore, we plan to evaluate what timestamp accuracy can be achieved in a prac-
tical environment in order to quantify the actual size of the anonymity groups for the
various schemes. Another promising field for future research activities is the design
of more advanced data retention techniques, e. g., by introducing dedicated retention
identifiers which preserve the privacy of users, while at the same time offering im-
proved traceability.
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